



Canada and the pursuit of peace

**Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee
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About the CPCC

The Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee (CPCC), is a network of Canadian non-governmental organizations and institutions, academics and other individuals from a wide range of sectors, including humanitarian assistance, development, conflict resolution, peace, faith communities, and human rights. CPCC has been working since 1994 to formulate policy and operational directions for Canadian NGOs involved in peacebuilding, in collaboration with other relevant actors.

The CPCC supports greater and more effective Canadian participation in peacebuilding activities by:

- ▶ Enabling active collaboration between Canadian peacebuilding organizations and their counterparts in the South and North;
- ▶ undertaking and facilitating systematic learning and dissemination and application of learning related to peacebuilding objectives, practices and outcomes;
- ▶ Enabling peacebuilding and human security policy dialogue and policy development involving Canadian non-governmental and governmental agencies and individuals and others.

CPCC Working Groups have been established to bring together those interested in particular thematic areas. Current Working Groups are Small Arms, Children and Armed Conflict, Gender and Peacebuilding, Conflict Prevention and Peace Operations. The CPCC Secretariat provides administrative and substantive support to the overall network, its Executive Committee and Working Groups. The Secretariat also undertakes the organization and delivery of specific activities not necessarily related to the Working Groups. CPCC activities and the operation of CPCC secretariat are funded by Foreign Affairs Canada, the International Development Research Centre and through the membership fees and other contributions of member organizations and individuals.

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Introduction

This contribution to public debate on Canadian foreign policy has been developed by the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee to assist Canadian efforts to build a more peaceful world. It focuses on the role Canada can play as part of an enhanced multilateral effort to prevent violent conflict and, when prevention fails, to engage effectively in conflict resolution and post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction.

The key to Canadian success as a peacemaker lies in an unequivocal commitment to multilateralism, to the rule of international law, to human rights, and to the United Nations Charter. In a complex and interconnected world, collective, multilateral strategies, institutions and action are indispensable. There can be no lasting development without security and no security without development; and both are linked inextricably to respect for human rights and for the rule of law.

As a member of the Group of Eight, with one of the strongest economies in the world, Canada can lead in the pursuit of peace. To do so requires a strategic framework that includes all areas of Canadian endeavour abroad from conflict prevention, through conflict resolution to post-conflict rebuilding.

Success as a peacemaker also demands greater government-civil society cooperation. Meaningful consultations are needed to assess how the new mechanisms announced or confirmed in the International Policy Statement in April 2005, including the Global Peace and Security Fund, the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force, and Canada Corps, can be most effective. Not only a “whole of government”, but a “whole of Canada” approach is required.

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In the continuing process of United Nations reform governments need to agree on the nature of the threats and opportunities facing the world and take decisive action to meet them. This submission concludes with a proposed Comprehensive Canadian Action Plan for development, security and human rights, one firmly rooted in multilateral cooperation.

This paper draws on specific inputs from member organizations of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee and CPCC Working Groups, background research and a number of consultative meetings. Peggy Mason, Gerald Ohlsen, Flaurie Storie and David Lord compiled the submission and Surendrini Wijeyaratne provided research and planning support. It is hoped that it will form part of a broad consultation that will foster a more effective engagement in the world by Canadians.

1. The international landscape

Complexity and interconnectedness

The international landscape left in the wake of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 is marked by complexity and interconnectedness. United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan referred to this in his recent proposal for reform of the UN:

“In our globalized world, the threats we face are interconnected. The rich are vulnerable to the threats that attack the poor and the strong are vulnerable to the weak, as well as vice versa. A nuclear terrorist attack on the United States or Europe would have devastating effects on the whole world. But so would the appearance of a new virulent pandemic disease in a poor country with no effective health-care system... On this interconnectedness of threats we must found a new security consensus...”¹

¹ *In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, March 21, 2005

The emergence of new centres of state power, simultaneously with state weakness and failure, the evident power of non-state actors – terrorists, mercenaries, warlords, business corporations, faith-based movements and global civil society – and the disproportionate power of the United States, are key features of the new complexity.

Competition and cooperation

The Cold War, in which two massive alliances competed for “spheres of influence”, has not been replaced by the hegemony of the United States. Rather, the U.S., European Union, China, Russia, India, Japan and Brazil are emerging as major powers through a process that is neither coherent nor complete. Relations within and among them are marked by both competition and cooperation. Direct military confrontation between them is unlikely, most having the capacity to inflict unacceptable damage on the other. Cooperation and accommodation are apt to typify their relations, despite the deep ideological differences and competing strategic needs that may separate them.

Competition for resources, particularly oil and water, is the factor most likely to aggravate relations among the new powers. Such competition has been central to several conflicts in the past decade, and to the inability of the international community to manage them. In Iraq, the U.N. Security Council was paralyzed as much by the conflicting oil interests as by disagreement about the presence of weapons of mass destruction. The conflicts in the Great Lakes region of Africa have been aggravated, if not driven, by resource competition between the United States and France, and countries in the region.

Given their need for global trade and investment – and thus for a stable international environment – the great powers of the 21st Century can be expected to maintain and strengthen the existing rules-based international system of economic and political governance. At the same time, they will seek to structure that system and the institutions that manage it in their own interests and to minimize restrictions on their freedom of action. For the great majority of smaller nations, including Canada, the working of that system, and in particular its capacity to manage and constrain the competing ambitions of the larger powers, will be of primary importance.

Weak, failing and failed states

Global interconnectedness links us all to weak, failing and failed states. Profound economic disparity, absolute poverty, the continuing colonial legacy, post-Cold War Great Power disengagement and chronic local failures of governance all affect the health of states, the security of the people within them and the security of the world.

Failing and failed states are inherently unstable, the weakening or collapse of domestic governance creating conditions for violence, as various actors seek to capture the state and its resources for their own ends. Such states may readily shelter terrorist and criminal elements whose interests lie directly in the instability and insecurity they help create. In many failing states children and youths make up at least 50 per cent of the population and are severely affected by violent conflict as victims and perpetrators, the lack of educational and employment opportunities, gender-based violence and lack of access to effective health and other services.

According to the UK Department of International Development:

“Effective states depend on effective political leadership equipped with the skills to manage conflicting interests, agree effective policies, and see through structural change. Where institutions are weak, personalities often dominate. In the worst cases, predatory leaders unchecked by institutional constraints can steal property, kill people, and ruin the economy.

“Effective states also need ‘inclusive institutions’ that respect the interests of the wider population and are more likely to benefit the poor. In the long run, stable and effective states are those in which government policies and public institutions are able to generate public support....”²

Lists of failing and failed states vary but they are all long and global – Cambodia, Haiti, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Burundi, the Congo, Liberia, Sudan, Ivory Coast, Somalia, Afghanistan – some are struggling back but all remain

² UK Department of International Development, *Why we need to work more effectively in fragile states*, January 2005

at risk, if not in chaos. Many others are endangered, structurally unsound or ill led at the centre. Some, like Zimbabwe and Myanmar, are obvious; others, like Nigeria, Pakistan, or even South Africa, may deteriorate dramatically in the future.

The human and financial costs of state failure stagger the imagination. Anticipating and preventing the failure of states is one of the primary challenges facing the international community. Anticipating how fragile states impact the lives of different segments of populations based on gender, economics, age, ethnicity, and region poses a deeper challenge. And yet, it is essential for effective prevention, response and reconstruction strategies.

Another challenge is the definition of an appropriate international response to what, for want of a better term, are called “rogue states”. A sub-set of the failing state, but stable through repression, coherent and well armed, they choose to be isolated from the international system and are unresponsive to conventional diplomatic or economic pressure. Such states are particularly problematic when, as in the case of North Korea, they have some nuclear capacity or can threaten or create chaos out of all proportion to their size and significance.

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Non-state actors

Added to this new global mix is an array of non-state actors with substantial economic, political or military clout. Growing global wealth, the development of communications technology and the continued marginalization of millions of people suggest that their number, variety and influence will continue to expand. Some – responsible civil society organizations, faith-based movements, socially responsible business corporations – are committed to furthering the peaceful resolution of conflicts and social and economic equity. Others – warlords, mercenaries, terrorist networks, unscrupulous business operators, and criminal organizations – generate and profit from violence.

To quote Herfried Munkler:

“Along with the heightened presence of mercenary firms, the return of the warlord is a reliable indicator that war is once more worthwhile – at least when it can be waged with light weapons and cheap fighters, and when there is scope for linking up with global big business...

“The new warlords...again derive their income directly from the fighting of wars, and thereby profit from the collapse of many states that can no longer maintain, or in any way enforce, their monopoly on violence. Disintegration of the state again gives them free rein to privatize and forcibly appropriate the profits of war, while the devastating long-term consequences of the violence have to be borne by society, or what is left of it.”³

On Al-Qaeda, Frank Gregory and Paul Wilkinson, in a Chatham House briefing paper on *Security, Terrorism and the UK*, state:

“Al-Qaeda, which is best described as a movement or a network of networks and affiliates with a presence in at least 60 countries, confronts the U.S. and its allies and the whole international system with the most dangerous form of terrorist threat ever posed by non-state actors. Unlike the more traditional terrorist groups formed in the 1970s and 1980s, Al-Qaeda explicitly promotes mass killing, and the 9/11 attacks, together with their major assaults in Kenya, Bali, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Spain, prove that they remain committed to carrying out deadly and determined attacks wherever and whenever the opportunity arises.”⁴

While there has been a surge of terrorist attacks in 2004 and 2005, over the past three decades international terrorism has killed fewer than 1,000 people a year, according to the *Human Security Report 2005*. Notwithstanding that low death toll, international terrorism remains a major human security concern because it triggered war in Iraq

³ Herfried Munkler, *The New Wars*, pp 91-92, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2005

⁴ Frank Gregory and Paul Wilkinson, “Riding Pillion for Tackling Terrorism is a High-risk Policy”, *ISP/NSC Briefing Paper 05/01*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 2005

and Afghanistan, while action and reaction has fuelled the growth in anti-Americanism in Muslim countries and fears of terrorist acquisition of weapons of mass destruction have been heightened.⁵

The role of the U.S.

Despite its dominance, the U.S. has neither the military nor financial capacity to exercise global control. Two major conflicts – Iraq and Afghanistan – have drained its supply of deployable troops, and constrained its ability to act by conventional means elsewhere. They have also seriously compromised the post-Cold War trend favouring collective efforts to manage conflict thus to create a safer world. The current fervent belief in American exceptionalism and predilection to use force to secure national economic and political interests, which may well survive the Bush Administration, poses enormous risks to both global and American interests. According to Dennis Gormley, Senior Fellow at the Monterey Institute:

“A single-minded American campaign against terrorism and rogue states in which countries are either ‘with us or against us’ and bullied into support is not leadership but a geostrategic wrecking ball that will destroy America’s own half-century old international architecture.”

Rather than seeking to negotiate adjustments to the international order that would contribute to global stability, but in which it would have an immense competitive advantage, the U.S. seems interested only in institutions that explicitly conform to its will. This has created a deep rift between those who favour a democratic, rules-based international system, and the American disposition, at times shared by other permanent members of the UN Security Council, to dictate rules while remaining accountable only to themselves. This challenges Canadians and others to work with like-minded Americans to turn the power and energy of the U.S. away from global exceptionalism and aggressive militarism.

2. A Canadian conflict prevention and peacebuilding policy

Global problems, global solutions

Global problems require global solutions that fairly address the legitimate needs and interests of all. This is the only basis for a sustainable future. It is the basis of the United Nations Charter – *combining* to achieve *common* aims – and it is more relevant than ever, given the complex and profoundly interdependent world in which we live. To be effective in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, Canada must ground its actions in a government-wide, human-security-centred international policy based on the international rule of law, as set out in the UN Charter and elaborated through international treaties and the practice of states. However, at the very moment when strengthening of the rules-based international system is urgent, this system is under attack from both without and within, from non-state actors at one extreme and, at the other, from reactionary elements within the very state that was the its prime architect.

Reaffirming the Charter

The principles underpinning the United Nations Charter⁶ reflect bedrock Canadian values of tolerance, justice and fair play; of security with, not against, others; of the fundamental importance of the rule of law both within and among states; of the primacy of human dignity and of the need for states to cooperate to these ends. Our starting point, therefore, must be to reaffirm the primacy of the Charter and international law as the cornerstones of our international policy. We must declare our intention to act strictly in accordance with the Charter and the rest of our international legal obligations and to call on all other states to do likewise. Only in this manner can Canada insulate

⁵ *Human Security Report 2005*, Human Security Centre, Vancouver 2005

⁶ Principles of the U.N. Charter

- The equality and dignity of persons and of nations.
- The peaceful resolution of disputes in conformity with justice and international law.
- The use of force only in the common interest and in conformity with the U.N. Charter and international law.
- Social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.
- International cooperation to solve international problems of an economic, social, cultural and humanitarian character.
- International cooperation to promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

itself from complicity in actions that, at best, contribute to the weakening of international law and international institutions or, at worst, directly contravene our international legal obligations under such treaties as the Anti-Torture Convention, the Refugee Convention or the Charter itself.

We need, however, not only to react defensively, but to take bold action to enhance and buttress the duty to cooperate that is enshrined in the Charter. Multilateral cooperation in the pursuit of a peaceful world is not a luxury or an act of charity or an activity we pursue only with a chosen few. It is *the* imperative for the survival of humanity.⁷ Canada can and should lead in the renewal of multilateralism through the progressive strengthening of international law and international organizations, based on an explicit commitment to the common security of all states and their peoples. This requires the promotion of an enhanced duty of international cooperation in the interests of, and for the benefit of, all states. To give substance to this, these principles should be built into Government of Canada decision-making at the Cabinet level through a requirement for Canada's international policies to meet a dual test – both globally and to Canada – of demonstrable benefit.

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A final note here about Canada-US relations. Canada cannot espouse one set of rules and values for our dealings with the rest of the world and another for Canada-U.S. relations. Relations with our closest ally and main trading partner must be based on the same fundamental principles and values as the rest of our international policy and indeed of our domestic policy. As noted earlier, the U.S. faces growing constraints on its economic and political power. More serious than its overestimation of the utility of force has been its profound error in seeing multilateralism and a rules-based international order as dangerous constraints, rather than recognizing that they can provide the essential underpinning and legitimation of American power.

It is imperative that Canada seek to persuade its closest neighbour and ally of the need to change course, to turn away from militarism and unilateralism and to assert genuine leadership based on consultation and cooperation with its friends and allies in our mutual interest. Many Americans do not need persuading. "Updating the Good Neighbor Policy of U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt" was recently launched at the U.N. by the American International Relations Center. Principle 3 of the AIRC's policy states:

"Given that our national interests, security, and social well-being are interconnected to those of other peoples, U.S. foreign policy must be based on reciprocity rather than domination, mutual well-being rather than cutthroat competition, and cooperation rather than confrontation."⁸

Recommendation

▶ ***A dual test of Canadian and global benefit for all international policies should be introduced into Memoranda to Cabinet, based on good global citizenship, sustainable interdependence and respect for and cooperation with our international neighbours.***

Human Security

One of the important advances in our understanding of security has been the concept of "human security", enunciated by then U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in the 1992 document *An Agenda for Peace*. This document cast security in individual as well as national terms and enlarged the concept to include both "hard" or traditional threats to security from overt military action and unconventional threats such as climate change, resource depletion and extreme poverty.

... Canada should lead in the strengthening of the concept of human security through the explicit incorporation of gender perspectives and women's rights into this discussion.

⁷ It is instructive to recall the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, which declared outer space to be the common heritage of humanity, the exploration and use of which shall be for the benefit of all states, requiring an *active* duty to cooperate to this end.

⁸ See *A Global Good Neighbor Ethic for International Relations*, (May 2005), www.irc-online.org/content/ggn/index.php.

According to Ernie Regehr and Peter Whelan of Project Ploughshares:

“The primary threats to the safety and welfare of individuals in most instances do not stem from external military forces bent on attacking the territorial integrity of their state or on undermining its sovereignty by imposing their will on an otherwise safe and stable national order. Rather, the primary threats to security are internal and manifest in conditions of economic failure, the violation of basic rights and political marginalization. It follows, therefore, that the primary guarantor of the security of people is less likely to be a formidable military equipped to keep foreign powers at bay than favourable social, political and economic conditions. In other words, the promotion of human development, basic rights and political participation are at least as essential to advancing human security, and thus national and international security, as are the development of effective military forces.”⁹

In keeping with the promise in the International Policy Statement that Canada will “renew” its leadership in human security, Canada must bring a human security lens to all aspects of its international and domestic policy. This would require balance in the assessment of the relative seriousness of different threats – military, economic, environmental or social – but could facilitate the fashioning of measured and effective responses, with the weight of our efforts and resources directed at the most compelling problems for humanity and the most vulnerable in failing states, including children and women. Furthermore, Canada should lead in the strengthening of the concept of human security through the explicit incorporation of gender perspectives and women’s rights into this discussion.

“...The challenge in looking at women's empowerment in the context of human security is to move beyond identifying 'women's issues' at the margins of the primary discussion. The goal is not to develop an annex to the primary discussion that highlights where and how women are the exception to general human security issues. Rather the commitment to gender equality raises questions that influence the centre of the definition of human security. There are at least two vital questions:

- ▶ Whose security is being considered (which men's? which women's?)?
- ▶ How do gender inequalities and differences affect people's ability (both women and men, individually and collectively), to both articulate their security needs and mobilize resources to meet those security needs?”¹⁰

Continued respect for human rights is essential to effectively addressing human security issues, including terrorism. We will not be protected by national security rules that allow shoddy intelligence to go forward unchallenged or that subvert due process. This will leave us in the worst of all worlds – fundamental civil liberties curtailed, national security unprotected and our globally respected system of justice compromised.

Recommendations:

Canada should:

- ▶ ***Improve its capacity to engage in the peaceful prevention and resolution of violent conflict;***
- ▶ ***Ensure proportionality between national security measures and the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, including through effective democratic oversight mechanisms for all national security measures;***
- ▶ ***Improve its capacity to support sustainable, equitable international development;***
- ▶ ***Ensure that its commercial policies support, rather than undermine, international development policy;***
- ▶ ***Place gender equality at the center of the human security agenda.***

⁹ Ernie Regehr and Peter Whelan, *Reshaping the Security Envelope: Defence Policy in a Human Security Context*, Project Ploughshares Working Paper, November 2004

¹⁰ Beth Woroniuk, *Women's Empowerment in the Context of Human Security*. Report of the joint workshop of United Nations Interagency Committee on Women and Gender Equality (IACGWE) and the Working Party on Gender Equality of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC), held December 1999, Bangkok. Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women (OSAGI) (2000). \

Human security, gender equality and women's rights¹¹

Equality between men and women is a cornerstone of Canadian international policy. Canada is a signatory to the *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination (CEDAW)* and was on the Security Council when *UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (2000)* was passed. Canada's domestic commitment to gender equality is mapped out in *Setting the Stage for the Next Century: The Federal Plan for Gender Equality*.

Canada's international policy priorities include the elimination of violence against women, the full and equal participation of women in decision-making processes, and the mainstreaming of a gender perspective. This commitment is further reinforced in Canadian International Development Agency programming, which "support(s) the full participation of women as equal partners in the sustainable development of their societies." While Canada's "Freedom from Fear" framework does include the goal of gender equality, the extent to which gender equality and women's rights has been incorporated into each priority in the framework remains unclear.¹² Gender equality mainstreaming into each policy area is imperative to developing effective policies and programs that respond to the security needs of women and men and girls and boys.

Despite Canada's achievements toward gender equality much remains to be done to translate these commitments into effective action. Canada's commitment to equality between women and men and girls and boys and the protection of the rights of girls and women must be clear and unambiguous. Gender equality must be explicitly integrated within Canada's diplomatic, development, defence and trade policies and programming.

At the international policy level, this requires government to provide both moral and financial leadership in promoting equality between women and men in multilateral and bilateral relationships and that all policy formulation include a thorough gender-based analysis. In the particular area of security policy it demands that efforts designed to increase human security have a clear gender equality dimension and explicitly include freedom from gender-based violence.

To quote Louise Arbour, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights:

"...Even after decades of struggle, violence against women remains a major impediment to the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms in every country in the world. In conflict and in peacetime, in the private and public spheres, violence against women is perhaps the most pervasive of all violations of human rights. Too often such violence is tolerated and its perpetrators excused. States have an obligation to protect women's rights, provide justice for victims and hold perpetrators accountable. Inadequate legislation must be reformed and existing legal protection must be implemented effectively. This necessitates more than rhetorical commitment: it requires resources to improve access to justice, to train and sensitize judges, legal professionals and law enforcement officials at all levels, to provide shelter and legal assistance to victims, and to launch effective public awareness campaigns."¹³

Multilaterally, Canada must continue to work to end impunity for those responsible for genocide crimes and gender-based violence by allocating additional funds for international criminal justice, for gender-sensitive training workshops, and technical support for tribunals and special courts, including gender-sensitive investigators, and training of judges and prosecutors.

¹¹ Prepared by the Gender and Peacebuilding Working Group (GPWG) of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee. See also *A Civil Society Perspective on Canada's Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security*.

¹² Erin Baines: *Rethinking Women, Peace and Security: A critique of Canada's human security agenda* Working Paper No. 1, Liu Institute for Global Issues, February 2005.

¹³ United Nations, "High Commissioner For Human Rights and UN Expert Call For Protection of Women's Rights As Way To Curb Gender Violence", Press release, Nov. 25, 2004 <http://www.defendingwomen-defendingrights.org/unprotection.php>

Recommendations:

- ▶ *All Memoranda to Cabinet should include an explicit gender-based analysis, in order to ensure that the impact of the proposed policy or programme supports greater gender equality.*
- ▶ *The protection and promotion of the rights of girls and women, and a commitment to work towards equality between men, women, girls and boys, must be explicitly stated elements of Canadian international policy.*
- ▶ *Renewed momentum (and resources) is required to ensure that CIDA's Gender Equality Policy creates results across Canada's development assistance generally and more specifically in humanitarian assistance, support to fragile states and post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives.*
- ▶ *Canada should provide the resources (financial, human and political), necessary to translate its commitments into consistent policies and programs. As part of this resource allocation, the Government of Canada should create a Women, Peace and Security Fund within FAC's Human Security division to ensure gender equality and women's rights are incorporated into each policy priority.*
- ▶ *Canada should develop effective mechanisms, including indicators, to monitor and ensure the full implementation of the international resolutions, treaties, conventions and platforms of action it has signed and supported – in particular UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000).*
- ▶ *Canada should support the achievement of gender balance in international courts and tribunals and allocate funds for gender-sensitive training in international criminal justice.*

Small arms and light weapons

Canada has been an international leader in formulating solutions to the challenges arising from the widespread misuse of small arms and light weapons by encouraging human security or “people-centred” responses and by acknowledging the need for a wide range of multilateral, intra-governmental efforts based on the cooperation of governments and civil society.

The 2001 UN *Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects* (PoA) provides an internationally agreed framework and follow-up process for national, regional and global action to combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and their proliferation and misuse. Best use should be made of the period up to and including the Programme of Action Review Conference of July 2006 by both civil society and governments, to ensure that the review conference makes the greatest possible improvements to the programme. To aid in this work, the Small Arms Working Group of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee has commissioned research and carried out consultations among Canadian civil society groups¹⁴ that have given rise to the following key recommendations.

A global ban on civilian possession of military assault weapons

Military assault weapons are designed to kill humans. The growing consensus that there are no legitimate grounds for the use of such weapons by civilians has led many states to adopt national measures to prohibit or restrict civilian possession. With efforts to incorporate into the Programme of Action a global norm prohibiting civilian possession of military assault weapons failing narrowly in 2001, the time is ripe for Canada to redouble its efforts to secure multilateral agreement in 2006 for the ban.

International standards for the transfer of small arms and light weapons

The national control of small arms transfers, according to common international standards, is essential to combating illicit trafficking and to addressing its human cost. Canada should lead a multilateral initiative to prohibit such transfers, unless authorized by importing and exporting states in a manner consistent with their obligations under international law.

Reducing the demand for small arms and light weapons

Often linked to organized or individual crime, the vigorous private demand for small arms reflects negative social, economic, and political conditions leading people to turn to arms to ameliorate their situation. Canada should encourage

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¹⁴ *Policy Recommendations for a Canadian response to the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons (SALW)*, Small Arms Working Group policy brief, Project Ploughshares, March 2005

recognition of the root causes of small arms and light weapons demand and promote measures, particularly those based on community participation, that address people's basic needs and fears. It should pursue a variety of programme responses, including the promotion of good governance, security sector reform and the development of a political environment committed to security, community safety and a culture of peace. This implies support for development and, in post-conflict situations, for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes that take into account linkages between development and disarmament. Canada should also support programs linking conflict resolution and demand reduction, encouraging national and sub-regional collaboration between civil society and governments on the issue and effective NGO capacity development. Attention should be paid to programs that will reduce demand such as adequately funded post-conflict rehabilitation programs, programs that focus on children and youth, early reconciliation processes and peace education.

National policies

Our strong support for innovative measures to help developing countries effectively address both the supply and demand sides of the small arms problem has not been matched by decisive action at home to meet our international commitments under the UN Programme of Action and related international treaties. Canada has signed but still not ratified the Organization of American States Convention Against the Illicit Trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons and the UN Firearms Protocol. Nor has Canada introduced national regulation of SALW brokering, despite undertaking to do so in both the 2001 UN Programme of Action and within the framework of the Wassenaar Arrangement. The Programme of Action also commits Canada to ensuring that our arms transfers conform with international humanitarian law and other existing international legal obligations. Canada has yet to amend its arms transfer policy and authorization procedures to ensure that this fundamental commitment is met.

Recommendations

- ▶ *Canada should endorse and advance a global ban on civilian possession of military assault weapons.*
- ▶ *Canada should re-energize multilateral efforts to advance state control of the transfer of small arms and light weapons according to common international standards.*
- ▶ *Canada should take further action to help reduce the demand for SALW.*
- ▶ *Canada should do more to support relevant multilateral initiatives to alleviate the impact of small arms and light weapons.*
- ▶ *Canada should adopt national policies and procedures to strengthen control of and action on small arms and light weapons.*

Children and armed conflict

Canada has also led international efforts to end the involvement of children in armed conflict as combatants, as deliberate targets, and as victims. While there has been progress in setting norms, children are still the victims, often the primary victims, of war. Thousands, particularly adolescent girls, are subjected to rape and other sexual violence. Tens of thousands are lured or coerced into becoming child soldiers. Millions are internally displaced or living outside their home countries as refugees. Thousands of others become victims of human trafficking.

New international norms have been established, such as a ban on the use of child soldiers and the inclusion of education in emergency assistance. Awareness has been raised about the impact of war on young people. Nevertheless, millions of children still lack protection for their security and basic rights in situations of armed conflict. Implementation is key and political leadership is needed to make the transition from principles and policies to action on the ground.

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Ignoring the role of disillusioned, marginalized youth is a common strategic mistake; children are not a "soft" issue. People under 18 make up 40 to 60% of the population in many conflict-prone countries. In pre-conflict situations they can be a force for peace, but are equally apt to be agents of instability and violence. In countries emerging from conflict, they need intensive support to move successfully from association with armed forces to earning peaceful livelihoods. Civil society networks and organizations can be particularly effective in marshalling local and international resources to meet the needs of young people in both situations.

Further, youth-centered policies and programs must make concerted efforts to connect youth and gender. Girls and young women make up large segments of conflict-affected populations. Their experiences are diverse, as refugees or as internally displaced persons, as mothers and heads of households, as survivors of sexual violence and exploitation, as survivors of poverty, as members of fighting forces, and as leaders in peacebuilding. Girls and young women are crucial actors in post-conflict reconstruction and in the rebuilding of peaceful communities and yet are at particularly high risk of sexual violence and exploitation, especially in refugee or IDP camps. Specific consideration for the experiences, needs, and aspirations of girls must be integral to strategies aimed at children and youth.

Strategically, protection for children has made the most progress on the human security agenda promoted by Canada. The UN Security Council has passed six resolutions. The most recent, Resolution 1612, established, among other measures, a mechanism to provide timely, reliable information on the use of child soldiers and on specific abuses committed against children affected by armed conflict. It calls on the countries involved to draw up concrete, time-bound action plans to halt the abuses. The challenge lies in implementation. Canada can and should continue to lead in extending child protection through diplomacy, assistance, and pressure to encourage compliance with international law. Its arms control legislation should be amended specifically to prohibit the shipment of arms into any country or region where they may be used by forces that violate the security and rights of children.

The focus on youth is changing the mode of international engagement with non-state armed groups and may be a way to bring them into discussions about the non-military resolution of conflicts. The Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, for example, specifically addresses compliance by non-state actors with human rights laws. Security Council missions in conflict zones have engaged directly with non-state forces on the question of child protection. That said, the tendency since September 11th, 2001 to label youth associated with fighting forces as terrorists is not helpful. Research is needed on the impact of anti-terrorism initiatives on youth as anecdotal evidence suggests that erosion of protection for youth in the name of anti-terrorism creates long-lasting resentment and grievances.

Recommendations

- ▶ *Canada should work to ensure effective compliance with UN Security Council resolutions bearing on civilian protection.*
- ▶ *Canada should work in all relevant multilateral fora to further compliance with international norms for child protection.*
- ▶ *Canada should encourage the Human Security Network to engage more fully on child protection issues and to play a more strategic role in specific situations where children are threatened.*
- ▶ *Canada should use a 'double lens' of youth and gender to identify the areas of particular vulnerability for girls in conflict-affected communities and to promote appropriate strategies for girls' participation in peacebuilding and reconstruction activities.*
- ▶ *Canada should make capacity-building within civil society a key component of its security strategy.*
- ▶ *Canada should support strategic and applied research on the impact of anti-terrorism laws and policies on young people.*
- ▶ *Canada should establish a mechanism for sharing strategic analysis, strategy development for specific situations, and good practices among government officials and non-governmental experts in child protection.*

3. Conflict prevention and resolution

Prevention, rather than reaction

While collective security has been pursued largely by reacting to crises rather than by working to prevent them, there is now a growing recognition that prevention is dramatically more effective in saving lives and far less costly than is either all-out war or the rebuilding of societies devastated by violent conflict. This is true whether the conflict is a war within, between, or among states, or is the result of violence undertaken by non-state actors locally, or on a global scale.

While there is no single cause, recent experience demonstrates that violence often erupts in countries that have a poor development record and weak or failing systems of governance. In the words of the Secretary General's Report on Prevention of Armed Conflict¹⁵:

“...[A]n effective conflict prevention strategy requires a comprehensive approach that encompasses both short-term and long-term political, diplomatic, humanitarian, human rights, developmental, institutional and other measures taken by the international community, in cooperation with national and regional actors.”

Operational prevention focuses on the threat of immediate violence, while structural prevention addresses the economic, social and political forces that cause conflict. The latter entails working to achieve justice, meet human needs, govern effectively, implement respect for human rights, and manage conflict effectively. Urgent action is needed to strengthen the multilateral political and legal framework for conflict prevention and resolution, to target development and diplomatic assistance to the prevention of state failure, to provide security for people in countries at risk, and to develop institution-building capacity to support local agents of change.

Urgent action is needed to strengthen the multilateral political and legal framework for conflict prevention and resolution ...

Canadian civil society organizations, along with network organizations in 15 regions of the world, have joined in a Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, which aims to foster a shift from reaction to prevention, giving priority to deep prevention. Through that process, Canadian participants developed a set of recommendations to strengthen efforts in four key areas: the “Responsibility to Protect”¹⁶; human security; national governance; international law and global governance.¹⁷ The “Responsibility to Protect” was explicitly interpreted to favour the prevention of conflict.

Conflict resolution

Work on existing violent conflict is often called conflict resolution or peacemaking. Canadians, working through government, non-governmental organizations, regional organizations or the U.N., have a long history of quiet and, at times, high-profile conflict resolution through official and unofficial efforts. Recently, Canada has been effectively involved in bringing Congolese factions to the peace table, supporting peace processes in Sudan and Sri Lanka, attempting to prevent further war between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and in assisting the peace settlement in Northern Ireland. Non-governmental actors have been active as mediators, peace process enablers and in supporting people-to-people contacts in the Middle East, the Koreas, West Africa, the Horn of Africa, the Balkans, South Asia and elsewhere. The Government of Canada and Canadian civil society organizations have supported round tables across Canada to support women in peace processes in Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Sudan. Much more can be done in this area.

Canada and other interested governments must further develop their capacities and support the development and involvement of non-governmental specialists to mediate between and among warring factions and, wherever possible, use preventive diplomacy, particularly inclusive dialogue processes, to encourage the peaceful resolution of potentially violent conflict. Supporting and improving the “good offices” functions of the UN¹⁸ and regional and sub-regional inter-governmental organizations is also necessary.

¹⁵ Kofi A. Annan, *Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General*, New York: United Nations, 2002.

¹⁶ The Government of Canada initiated the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) that produced the report entitled *The Responsibility to Protect*. The report set out general principles and a framework that include national sovereignty involving responsibilities and not just rights; the moral imperative for the international community to act where the responsibility to protect citizens from serious harm is not being met; the continuum of responsibilities from prevention to reaction to rebuilding; and the emphasis on prevention as the priority responsibility.

¹⁷ *Canadian Action Agenda on Conflict Prevention* http://action.web.ca/home/cpcc/en_whatsnew.shtml?x=71767

¹⁸ As proposed by then U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in *Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, U.N. Document A/47/277 - S/24111.

Recommendations

▶ *Canada should strengthen its commitment to making the prevention of violent conflict a national and international priority; integrate conflict prevention into its international security policies and operational capacities; and provide increased resources to help prevent the emergence, escalation, or renewal of violent conflict.*

▶ *It is imperative that the concept of the Responsibility to Protect be understood as emphasizing the prevention of violent conflict, and that its translation into concrete initiatives demonstrate a commitment to this priority.*

▶ *Canada, drawing on recent European experience, should consider means to increasingly involve civilians in conflict management, including the creation of a civilian peace service or mechanism that would respond to requests for a civilian international presence to reduce violence and facilitate local civilian activities.*

▶ *Canada should support emerging commitments to good governance through diplomacy and enhanced technical assistance programs covering the political, security, judicial, economic and social dimensions of governance.*

4. Post-conflict peacebuilding

Principles and best practice

The implementation of peace settlements requires a full gamut of international intervention, moving from the restoration of security and provision of emergency humanitarian relief to support for good governance, reconstruction, economic development. This demands the engagement of the UN Security Council, a plethora of UN departments, funds, agencies and programmes, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the donor community of mainly developed countries, as well as the international non-governmental organizations that work in partnership with both bilateral and multilateral donors. These external actors interact with a multitude of local, national, governmental and non-state actors from the post-conflict country itself, from neighbouring countries and sub-regional groupings and, increasingly, from regional organizations mandated by the Security Council to assist in peace implementation.

Slowly, we are coming to recognize that for such complex social engineering to work an agreed multilateral framework is necessary. Ideally, it will be comprehensive, freely negotiated and agreed by the parties, and will address the aspects of governance “failure” that led to the conflict in the first place. Post-conflict peacebuilding must be as consensual as possible, with local ownership the fundamental guiding principle. The role of the third party is of assistance and facilitation; even when the U.N. assumes governance in the form of a transitional administration, as in East Timor, the aim is to return governance to national control as soon as possible.

To cite Necla Tschirgi of the International Peace Academy:

“Difficulties in achieving the delicate balance between genuine national ownership and effective partnerships between internal and external actors continue to plague recovery efforts and the long term sustainability of recovery efforts... Internal actors are too often treated as passive victims or as “the problem” rather than as active agents of recovery and rebuilding their own societies... The challenge is to ensure that the partnerships entail mutual learning, empower rather than undermine internal actors, and capitalize on local knowledge and skills. If external actors are committed to local ownership and empowering partnerships, then at the country level they have to integrate these commitments into their goals, priorities, plans, modus operandi and attitudes.”¹⁹

While the U.N. may or may not lead the peace negotiations, and UN-led “blue helmets” may or may not be the military force providing security during the implementation phase, only the UN Security Council can mandate a multidimensional peace operation under UN civilian leadership. When the U.N. role is a partial one, the result is a

¹⁹ Necla Tschirgi, *Building Effective Partnerships, Improving the Relationship between Internal and External Actors in Post-Conflict Countries*, IPA and WSP International, 2004

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proliferation of civilian and military “lead” nations and entities, resulting in gaps in the coverage of key political and security objectives and difficulty in achieving either a coherent common strategy or anything beyond the loosest of coordination arrangements.

In Afghanistan, the lack of a comprehensive framework under UN leadership has left most of the country outside Kabul without any international security assistance, while the work of judicial reform, drug control, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, policing and reform of the military are split among “lead nations”, with the UN initially only responsible for coordinating humanitarian relief and organizing elections. With a Senior Civilian Representative appointed by NATO, which commands the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and the American ambassador (arguably the most powerful civilian in the country), the “lead” role is distributed among at least seven sovereign entities.

There is no democracy at the barrel of a gun.

Despite the growing acceptance of the need for an overarching multilateral framework, many humanitarians still have profound doubts about the compatibility of actions based on purely humanitarian grounds with explicitly political objectives and outcomes. Many humanitarian workers and other civilians engaged in peacebuilding have concerns about being tied too intimately to a framework that includes a military component. By definition, use of the military implies coercion, if only as a last resort. But the foundation of successful peacebuilding is consent. The process of building local capacity for good self-governance simply cannot be forced. There is no democracy at the barrel of a gun.

The insistence on consent is pragmatic and crucial – the aim of the peace operation is not go to war with the parties but to help them build the democratic institutions and processes that will facilitate the non-violent management of societal conflicts.²⁰ Crucial as well is a reasonable degree of security. A robust force can deter violations and effectively address those that occur, thus building confidence in the peace process, assuming that all or most of the key players want peace more than war. If this is the case, individual spoilers can be isolated and dealt with effectively. To achieve the desired political outcome, the military component must be subordinated to, and at the service of, the overall mission objectives, as must all other mission components.

War fighting and peace support operations are not compatible. The inevitable result of combining the two is to fatally undermine the ability of the peace support component to actually support the peace process by gradually building the foundation of security on which virtually everything else depends.

Taking Afghanistan as a case in point, with the overriding necessity for security to be established throughout the country, as well as the fundamental incompatibility between war fighting and peacebuilding, Canada should only commit Canadian forces to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation and work to steadily increase the scope of the force to cover more and more of Afghanistan. We should also oppose any effort to formally combine the American-led coalition forces with the ISAF operation but, instead, back efforts to ensure that the activities of this force are carried out in such a manner as to support and enhance the overall objectives of the integrated civilian mission and ISAF, including the possibility of a broad-based consultation process (Loya Jirga) led by the Afghan government on civil-military relations.

Other areas where Canada can and should exercise multilateral leadership are in seeking the establishment by NATO of a Working Group to develop with the UN integrated mission and the Afghan government a concept for integrating the work of ISAF as closely as possible into the integrated civilian mission. In addition, with a view to facilitating the phase-out the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom, we should encourage NATO to work with the UN and the Afghan government to develop a robust anti-terrorist element for ISAF, one that is firmly based in international law. In parallel, we should propose an Afghan-led broad based consultative process on how to address the issue of the remnants of the Taliban in Afghanistan.

²⁰ In Somalia a broadly based peace conference was held which agreed to the deployment first of a U.S.-led stabilization force and then to the U.N. follow-on peacekeeping mission. The NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) deployed to Bosnia after the signing of the Dayton Accords. Even in East Timor, the Australian-led stabilization force acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter – which obviates the need for consent – would not deploy until Indonesia consented.

The UN Peacebuilding Commission

As Kofi Annan has pointed out:

“Roughly half of all countries that emerge from war lapse back into violence within five years... [I]f we are going to prevent conflict we must ensure that peace agreements are implemented in a sustained and sustainable manner. Yet at this very point there is a gaping hole in the United Nations institutional machinery: no part of the United Nations system effectively addresses the challenge of helping countries with the transition from war to lasting peace.”

The UN has intensified efforts to develop an effective systems-wide UN operational response, through a more sophisticated understanding of the concept of integrated missions. Support is growing for the principle of ‘asymmetric integration’, with only as much subsumed within the overarching strategic framework as is necessary to achieve the mission objectives.

To provide effective strategic oversight of peacebuilding, the UN Secretary-General has called on member states to adopt the recommendation of his *High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change* for the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission and a Peacebuilding Support Office within the Secretariat. The Commission would focus attention on the development and institution-building efforts necessary to recovery and provide a mechanism through which donors can make specific, sustainable commitments to the financing of peacebuilding and recovery.

The Commission would also provide a forum in which the UN major bilateral donors, troop contributors, regional actors and organizations, the international financial institutions and the national or transitional government of the country concerned could share information about recovery strategies and review progress towards medium-term goals. Should it facilitate the timely transition from *relief* financing to recovery and *development* financing, it might begin to close the funding gap that bedevils post-conflict peacebuilding efforts. Similarly, it should be able to improve the coordination of UN missions and agencies in post-conflict operations, with all the various departments, funds, programs and agencies participating as part of a single UN team, led by a senior official representing the Secretary-General. Most importantly, the Peacebuilding Commission would provide its members with a forum in which, together with the national authorities, common priorities would be set, helping to ensure that UN activities are financed according to shared objectives and not, as is too often the case, according to donor-specific or agency-specific priorities.

The Commission provides an opportunity for Canada to demonstrate its commitment to the UN system and to international obligations including the Beijing Platform for Action, CEDAW and SC Resolution 1325, which affirm that peace, security and development, the three pillars of international cooperation, require the equal participation of women. In this regard, the Commission provides an excellent opportunity to promote gender equality in relation to international peace and security.

The “Transition Gap”

As Development Workshop and other Canadian agencies involved in post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction have underlined:

“Strong policy coherence and donor coordination are critical in post-conflict transitions.”

The peacebuilding or transition funding gap represents the gulf between the end of humanitarian relief and the return of long-term development assistance. It is the gulf between despair and hope – the window of opportunity for external actors to seize. The failure of the international community to address the transition from war to sustainable peace perpetuates the fragility and poverty of weakened states, increases the likelihood of their return to violence, and keeps international assistance programs on the treadmill of endless peacekeeping and humanitarian relief.

It is not enough to set a common strategic framework and priorities. The multi-dimensional nature of peacebuilding, the multitude of actors, the inter-dependence of its parts, the need for responsiveness and long-term sustainability, the importance of local partnerships – all dictate a major requirement for coordination within and

between donor countries, with intergovernmental organizations and NGOs and – above all – with the intended recipients, from local community groups to national governments.

Given the current intensive development and implementation of national coordination ...Canada is in an extraordinarily good position to ensure that its nascent whole-of-government peacebuilding framework lies within the global strategic framework it is also helping to shape.

Canada was among the countries to propose an entity such as the Peacebuilding Commission to the High Level Panel. At the 2005 World Summit to review the Millennium Development Goals, Heads of State and Government decided to establish a Peacebuilding Commission as an intergovernmental advisory body, to begin work no later than 31 December 2005.

Given the current intensive development and implementation of national coordination and funding mechanisms, Canada is in an extraordinarily good position to ensure that its nascent whole-of-government peacebuilding framework lies within the global strategic framework it is also helping to shape.

Recommendations

- ▶ *Canada should work with like-minded countries within the UN to ensure that the development of structure, mandate and procedures for a new Commission be through a conference of state representatives and other stakeholders, including NGOs and civil society, mandated by and reporting to the U.N. General Assembly.*
- ▶ *Canada should ensure that its own peacebuilding architecture, particularly the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START), within Foreign Affairs, is appropriately linked to the global strategic framework. As Canada develops its own peacebuilding architecture, it should ensure that appropriate linkages are made with the UN Peacebuilding Commission and at the national and local levels in recipient countries.*
- ▶ *Canada should advocate for the incorporation of gender equality into the structure, mandate, and procedures of the Commission, including the participation of women at decision-making levels.*
- ▶ *Canada should be among the first to contribute to the proposed voluntary Standing Fund for Peacebuilding.*

5. Canadian peacebuilding mechanisms and tools

Shortcomings and remedies

Canada has substantial peacebuilding capacity. Canadians work through civil society organizations, academia, diaspora groups and government itself to prevent, manage or rebuild after violent conflict. Nevertheless, there is recurring criticism that our efforts are too short-term, *ad hoc*, diffuse and poorly-resourced to have sustained effects.

The remedies are also fairly well known. Rather than one- or two-year programs, we might develop five to 15-year programs, with appropriate mechanisms to finance, manage, monitor and evaluate them and link them to the overarching multilateral framework. Rather than reacting to crises, we might establish a multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary early warning and response capacity that can assess the risks of conflict, identify “what can be done, by whom and how, in order to prevent violence and encourage processes to address the conflict through peaceful means.”²¹ This analysis should be translated into action and that action subject to ongoing evaluation by a dedicated, standing unit of multisectoral and multidisciplinary conflict specialists, operating within a general strategic framework for Canadian peacebuilding policy (see below). Funding for this should not be diverted from human development goals, particularly the alleviation of poverty; it should be substantial, complementary, clearly identifiable in departmental and agency budgets and dedicated to conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

A framework for coherent action

A strategic framework encompassing all areas of Canadian peacebuilding abroad, from conflict prevention, through conflict mitigation to post-conflict rebuilding, with an enhanced priority on deep conflict prevention is required if

²¹ Submission for the U.N. Secretary-General’s Report for the Millenium+5 Review Summit, Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, www.gppac.net, Feb. 11, 2005.

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Canada is to be more visible and effective. Canada should lead in establishing greater national coherence and fostering more effective action within multilateral strategic frameworks. Canada and other donor countries should identify areas of action within their own competence, determined through national peacebuilding strategies. Common multilateral strategies will allow participants to identify and address gaps in coverage and to promote sustained, complementary programming.

A Canadian strategic framework would include a statement of Canadian values, interests and peacebuilding objectives, as well as a statement of priorities that takes into account Canada's general international policy objectives, the nature and extent of threats to human security and human rights in existing and emerging conflicts, our historical involvement in particular areas and our core peacebuilding competencies. Similarly, it should assess the international response to a given situation, and the available human and financial resources. It should provide a set of guidelines for the implementation of context-driven, effective, flexible, timely and sustained peacebuilding responses and principles for collaboration among both government and non-governmental actors. It would also create mechanisms for bilateral, cooperation in peacebuilding between Canada and others with particular priority to establishing appropriate linkages with the UN Peacebuilding Commission.

At the same time, Canada should make an explicit, long-term political and financial commitment to improving Canadian peacebuilding efforts, supplementary to necessary increases in existing development assistance.

The Canadian International Development Agency has had a special place in developing Canada's peacebuilding capacity and that investment in innovative programming must not be lost. The development component of the International Policy Statement recognizes that:

... It is essential to link both humanitarian responses and postwar reconstruction to strategies that address the causes and prevent the recurrence of armed conflict, particularly to long-term transformative activities in key areas like rural development.

“We cannot ignore countries in crisis or at risk of crisis: the failed and fragile states. We will therefore, reserve a special type of bilateral programming for a manageable number of ‘failed and fragile state’ situations – countries in or emerging from crisis and of overriding strategic importance – where we will provide humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, including through the Global Peace and Security Fund...”

But missing from this statement is the key lesson learned by international development community from its engagement in peacebuilding – that it is essential to link both humanitarian responses and postwar reconstruction to strategies that address the causes and prevent the recurrence of armed conflict, particularly to long-term transformative activities in key areas like rural development.

As conflict-sensitive development strategies lie at the core of sustainable peacebuilding, CIDA must participate fully in the emerging whole-of-government Canadian peacebuilding strategy. It should invest much more in developing its capacities for pro-poor, conflict-sensitive analysis, programming and evaluation. A priority in this regard should be to strengthen its support for networks of agents of change, including organizations working to promote women's rights in war-affected societies.

Recommendations

- ▶ **Canada should develop, through broad domestic consultation, a strategic framework that will improve its capacity to engage in effective peacebuilding and conflict prevention.**
- ▶ **CIDA should clearly endorse peacebuilding and give priority to the mainstreaming of conflict sensitive development and conflict prevention throughout the agency by providing the tools and funding necessary to build the capacity and training programmes necessary to develop and deliver new peacebuilding programming.**
- ▶ **CIDA should engage fully in whole-of-government strategies for conflict prevention and peacebuilding, particularly in areas such as equitable development, governance and local, participatory priority setting.**

Operationalizing responses

Canada has a well-developed capacity through the CANADEM²² roster to identify civilian experts for international missions. It has a world-class training capacity for civilians and military personnel in the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre²³. Nevertheless, pre-deployment training is mandatory only within the Department of National Defence, where it is primarily of a military nature, rather than being the integrated civilian-military training appropriate to the multidisciplinary environment that characterizes most peace operations. On the civilian side, despite the imperatives of operational effectiveness and personnel security, Canada has no requirement for civilian pre-deployment training.

Police officers deploying on a peace operation are provided with a relatively short orientation and administrative preparation program, conducted under RCMP sponsorship in Ottawa. Foreign Affairs and CIDA have no formal training programs prior to deploying their personnel into failed, failing or war torn states, or other complex and dangerous international crisis situations. Preparatory training provided by Canadian NGOs to employees varies widely.

Canada should require and provide adequate resources for all personnel on peace support operations, civilian, police, and military, to be provided with systematic gender training. At the level of field operations, Canada should increase support for gender advisors with peace support operations and require all organizations involved in humanitarian aid, peacebuilding and peace support operations to adopt and adhere to codes of conduct relating to the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse.

The minimalist Canadian approach to training stands in contrast to the comprehensive programs now mandatory in many European states and organizations. Pre-deployment training, appropriate to the nature and urgency of the mission, would ensure that Canadians arrive in the host country with an understanding of the dynamics of modern peace operations and the local environment of the host country, would reduce time spent learning on the job and would enhance personal safety and well-being.

Recommendations:

- ▶ *Canada should require all public and private agencies deploying Canadians to conflict zones using Government of Canada funds to provide their staff with an appropriate standard of preparatory training.*
- ▶ *Canada should allocate sufficient funds to meet civilian and military pre-deployment training requirements, including training for work in a multidisciplinary environment, in post-conflict rebuilding, in gender equality, and in democratic development.*
- ▶ *Building on the experience of our existing civilian reserve, CANADEM, the Government of Canada should further develop this country's pool of civilian peacebuilding technical expertise and deployment capacity.*
- ▶ *Canada should dedicate officers in the Department of National Defence to be responsible for internal implementation, training and oversight of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, and codes of conduct compliant with the Secretary General's bulletin on Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (2003).*

Government of Canada engagement with civil society

An important civilian peacebuilding community has developed in Canada. Many of the organizations that are part of it belong to umbrella organizations, most notably the Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC) and the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee (CPCC). The larger operational humanitarian agencies also participate in the Policy Action Group for Emergency Relief (PAGER), which “shares information and analyses of

²² CANADEM is a non-profit agency dedicated to advancing international peace and security through the recruitment, screening, promotion and rapid mobilization of Canadian expertise. It developed and maintains an open roster of Canadian international experts to strengthen the activities of international organizations, in particular the UN, OSCE, other inter-governmental agencies and institutions, and their non-governmental partners.

²³ The PPC is a government-financed, independently operated training centre located in Cornwallis, N.S. with offices in Montreal and Ottawa. It offers a range of peace operations training programs for civilians, military and police, which meet (and exceed) UN and other international standards.

issues impacting on the delivery of humanitarian assistance.” Academic networks, such as the Canadian Consortium on Human Security and Science for Peace, form another important constituency within this community

While many individual Canadian NGOs receive financial support from government to carry out peacebuilding activities, drawing on a multiplicity of funds, there are no standing mechanisms for sharing information, discussing strategies or developing collaborative action. Nevertheless, there are a number of areas of active collaboration between government and civil society. These include information sharing, limited joint policy development, participation in diplomatic delegations and joint advocacy on issues such as the establishment of the International Criminal Court.

While the *International Policy Statement* goes some way toward a better definition of the roles of departments and agencies, it is silent on the mechanics of coordination and on where and how civil society and government can better cooperate to meet the challenges of complex conflicts and post-conflict situations.

Joint conflict analysis is receiving increased attention, particularly within CIDA, but has yet to be fully integrated into the way in which Canada conducts its assessments. The Department of National Defence has taken some very tentative steps towards joint analysis through “peace gaming” with NGOs and other government departments. While there has been some improvement, the NGO community and the Canadian government and its agencies continue to reinvent the wheel each time they respond to violent political and military crises or work to avert them.

Coordination and cooperation

The recent emphasis on policy coherence and coordination among government departments and agencies reflects a new reality – a plethora of government departments and agencies are now involved in international activities, as are Canadian provincial governments and municipalities. Hence, when responding to conflict and natural disaster, there is a compelling need for greater intra-governmental cooperation to increase impact and efficiency and decrease duplication. While, in Afghanistan, Sudan and Haiti, Canadian officials are working more closely together to coordinate peace and conflict responses, familiar criticisms continue to be heard – some good cooperation at junior levels, but little to none at senior levels, and a lack of overall strategies that set out long-term objectives and the means by which they will be achieved.

The CPCC has recommended in the past that attempts to attain greater coherence aim at three structural goals:

- ▶ Clearly defined roles for various specialized government agencies;
- ▶ Clearly defined processes through which agencies can adjust and refine their policies; and
- ▶ An institutionalized locus for greater collaboration among government departments and agencies and between government and civil society in knowledge sharing, analysis, planning, implementation and the evaluation of programs.

While the *International Policy Statement* goes some way toward a better definition of the roles of departments and agencies, it is silent on the mechanics of coordination and on where and how civil society and government can better cooperate to meet the challenges of complex conflicts and post-conflict situations. It is unclear whether previously identified problems – a lack of clear priorities, made known and understood by the agencies involved; poor coordination in particular areas; a minimal development of complementary programming and a lack of follow-up – will be remedied.

The mechanisms announced in the *International Policy Statement* to improve the focus, delivery and funding of Canadian international assistance, particularly in conflict and post-conflict areas, are encouraging. This will be even more significant if the focus is squarely on closing the funding gap between emergency relief financing to recovery and development financing. Similarly, the priority given to government support for the international work of “existing networks of Canadians”, to seeking “regular input from Canadian NGOs, labour unions, business groups, academics and professional bodies” and to supporting “the efforts of diasporas to forge transnational, political, economic and cultural links” is a positive development. There is an immediate opportunity to increase government-civil society cooperation in conflict prevention and peacebuilding by instituting meaningful consultations on how these mechanisms, particularly the Global Peace and Security Fund, the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START), Canada Corps and the Democracy Council, can be used most effectively.

Recommendations:

▶ *Government should seek specific input from the non-governmental community with respect to the restructuring of its institutional frameworks and procedures for the development and implementation of Canadian peacebuilding and conflict prevention policy.*

▶ *Canada's new peacebuilding architecture must be able to support transitions in post-conflict environments from emergency relief financing to the recovery and development financing that is essential for sustainable peace.*

6. A blueprint for Canada and the world

In his recent report, *In Larger Freedom*, Kofi Annan proposed a program of action for U.N. member states to adopt at the September 2005 UN Summit, in order to implement the United Nations Millennium Declaration and to respond to the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. This remarkable 55-page document ends with an annex comprising all of the main commitments already made by states and which now need to be implemented, as well as additional steps necessary to meet the key global challenges in development, security and human rights – challenges which are pressing individually but which can be addressed effectively only if tackled in their interconnectedness. *In Larger Freedom* is a blueprint for action for Canada and the world. The Review Summit has now come and gone, with various forces acting to prevent the “sweeping and fundamental reform” the Secretary General had been seeking. Nonetheless, Kofi Annan and others remain convinced that reform efforts must continue. Canada can lead globally by coming forward with its own detailed plan to turn promises made into promises kept -- a formal action plan and model for others, setting out how this country will contribute to global efforts to achieve peace and prosperity.

Recommendation

▶ *Three social freedoms – freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to live in dignity – lie at the heart of an action plan for peace and prosperity. Canada could contribute greatly to their realization through the adoption of a formal Canadian Action Plan, a proposed draft of which is set out in Annex 1.*

ANNEX 1

A Canadian Action Plan for Development, Security and Human Rights for All

Freedom from Want

In order to reduce poverty, promote global prosperity for all, and build sustainable peace, Canada shall

- a) **Reaffirm**, and commit itself to implementing, the development consensus based on mutual responsibility and accountability agreed in 2002 at the International Conference on Financing for Development held in Monterrey, Mexico, and the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg, South Africa;
- b) **Support** these efforts through increased development assistance, a more development-oriented trade system and wider and deeper debt relief, recognizing the special and urgent needs of Africa;
- c) **Establish** a timetable to achieve the target of 0.7 per cent of gross national income for official development assistance by no later than 2015, starting with significant increases no later than 2006 and reaching at least 0.5 per cent by 2009;
- d) **Offer** significantly more debt reduction than has yet been on offer and ensure that additional debt cancellation be achieved without reducing the resources available to other developing countries and without jeopardizing the long-term financial viability of international financial institutions;
- e) **Exercise** a leadership role commensurate with its G8 status to ensure that the World Trade Organization Doha Round is completed no later than 2006, with full commitment to realizing its development focus, and as a first step provide immediate duty-free and quota-free market access for all exports from the least developed countries;
- f) **Launch**, in coordination with other donor countries to the maximum extent possible, a series of “quick win” initiatives so as to realize major immediate progress towards the Millennium Development Goals through such measures as the free distribution of malaria bed nets and the elimination of user fees for primary education and health services;
- g) **Continue** to exercise leadership to ensure that the international community urgently provides the resources needed for an expanded and comprehensive response to HIV/AIDS, and full funding for the Global Fund to fight AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria;
- h) **Reaffirm** gender equality and the need to overcome pervasive gender bias and violence by supporting direct interventions to protect women from violence, increasing primary school completion and secondary school access for girls, ensuring secure tenure of property to women, ensuring access to reproductive health services, promoting equal access to labour markets, providing opportunity for greater representation in government decision-making bodies;
- i) **Commit** to work in all relevant multilateral fora to further compliance with international norms for child protection;
- j) **Seek** to ensure concerted global action to mitigate climate change and establish a worldwide early warning system for all natural hazards;
- k) **Call** on the governments of developing countries to recommit themselves to taking primary responsibility for their own development by strengthening governance, combating corruption and putting in place the policies and investments necessary to drive private-sector led growth and maximize domestic resources to fund national development strategies, consistent with international agreements centred on the Millennium Development Goals.

Freedom from Fear

In order to provide effective collective security in the 21st Century, Heads of State and Government must take concerted action against the whole range of threats to international peace and security. To this end, Canada shall

- a) **Commit** itself to working with other UN member states to implement a new security consensus based on the recognition that threats are interlinked, that development, security and human rights are mutually interdependent, that no state can protect itself acting entirely alone and that all states need an equitable, efficient and effective collective security system;
- b) **Commit** to agreeing and implementing comprehensive strategies for confronting the whole range of threats, from international war through weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, state collapse and civil conflict to deadly infectious disease, extreme poverty and the destruction of the environment;
- c) **Commit**, at the national level, as part of its International Policy Review, to a broad public dialogue on the appropriate balance to be accorded these interlinked threats;
- d) **Reiterate** its pledge of full compliance with all articles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and the Chemical Weapons Convention to further strengthen the multilateral framework for non-proliferation and disarmament;
- e) **Commit** to expediting agreement on alternatives, consistent with the principles of Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to the acquisition of domestic uranium enrichment and plutonium separation facilities;
- f) **Undertake** to develop, with others and on an urgent basis, legally binding international instruments to regulate the marking, tracing and illicit brokering of small arms and light weapons and to ensure the effective monitoring and enforcement of United Nations arms embargoes;
- g) **Pledge** to ratify the Organization of American States Convention against trafficking in firearms and the UN Firearms Protocol and to enact national conventional arms brokering legislation no later than the end of 2005;
- h) **Undertake** to build on the work of the Fowler Expert Panels and subsequent efforts led by Sweden to enhance the capacity of the United Nations to effectively monitor UN arms embargoes;
- i) **Affirm** that no cause or grievance, no matter how legitimate, justifies the targeting and deliberate killing of civilians and non-combatants;
- j) **Declare** that any action intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act is to intimidate a population or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, constitutes an act of terrorism;
- k) **Resolve** to implement the comprehensive UN counter-terrorism strategy to dissuade people from resorting to terrorism or supporting it, deny terrorists access to funds and materials, deter states from sponsoring terrorism and develop state capacity to defeat terrorism, while defending human rights and the rule of law;
- l) **Pledge** to exercise leadership in the development of the Responsibility to Protect and to build support for a broad-based request by UN member states to the Security Council to adopt a resolution on the use of force that sets out principles for its use and expresses its intention to be guided by them;
- m) **Such** a resolution would set out principles for its use and confirm the intention of the Council to be guided by them. These principles should reaffirm both the provisions of the UN Charter with respect to the use of force, including Article 51, and the central role of the Security Council in peace and security. The resolution would also reaffirm the

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right of the Security Council to use military force, including preventively, to preserve international peace and security, including in cases of genocide, ethnic cleansing and other crimes against humanity. It would recognize the need to consider the seriousness of the threat, the proper purpose of the proposed military action, whether means short of the use of force might reasonably succeed in stopping the threat at hand, whether the military option is proportional to it and whether there is a reasonable chance of success, with success defined not only as prevailing in the military option but also in building a sustainable peace;

- n) **Work** toward a more effective multilateral institutional framework for military action, that is focused on the protection of civilians, and includes, in particular, the development of the necessary doctrinal underpinnings;
- o) **Reaffirm** its intention to contribute to UN-led and commanded peace operations in accordance with international law and the fundamental principles of consent and impartiality;
- p) **Rebuild** its capacity to contribute to UN peace operations by accelerating the already announced creation of a new 5,000 person peacekeeping brigade and by addressing equipment needs, including heavy-lift aircraft;
- q) **Work** to ensure that the development of the structure, mandate and procedures for the newly agreed UN Peacebuilding Commission be through a conference of state representatives and other stakeholders, including NGOs and civil society, mandated by and reporting to the UN General Assembly;
- r) **Support** and contribute to a voluntary Standing Fund for Peacebuilding;
- s) **Seek** agreement on the participation of civil society as of right in the Peacebuilding Commission, in light of the central role played by civil society organizations in peacebuilding;
- t) **Support** the creation of strategic reserves for UN peacekeeping and the efforts by the European Union, the African Union and others to establish standby capacities as part of an interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities;
- u) **Support** establishment of a UN civilian police standby capacity;
- v) **Seek** to ensure that Security Council sanctions are effectively implemented and enforced, and that the capacity of member states to implement sanctions is enhanced;
- w) **Work** to establish well resourced monitoring mechanisms within the UN Secretariat and regional organizations, as well as effective and accountable mechanisms to mitigate the humanitarian consequences of sanctions at all levels.

Freedom to Live in Dignity

Canada recommits itself to supporting the rule of law, human rights and democracy -- principles at the heart of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. To this end, Canada shall

- a) **Reaffirm** its commitment to human dignity by action to strengthen the rule of law, ensure respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and promote democracy, so that universally recognized principles are implemented in all countries;
- b) **Embrace** the “responsibility to protect” as a basis for collective action against genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and agree to act on this responsibility;

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- c) **Recognize** that this responsibility lies first and foremost with each individual state, whose duty it is to protect its population, but that if national authorities are unwilling or unable to protect their citizens, then the responsibility shifts to the international community to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other methods to protect civilian populations. If such methods appear insufficient the Security Council may decide to take enforcement action under the Charter;
- d) **Support** the 2005 treaty event, focusing on 31 multilateral treaties, and encourage any government that has not done so to agree to ratify and implement all treaties relating to the protection of civilians;
- e) **Support** democracy at home, in our hemisphere and the world;
- f) **Support** measures to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to assist emerging democracies, including the creation of a Democracy Fund to provide assistance to countries seeking to establish or strengthen their democracy;
- g) **Recognize** the important role of the International Court of Justice in adjudicating disputes among countries;
- h) **Consider** means to strengthen the work of the court including, at the national level, an immediate review of all reservations to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, with the aim of lifting those reservations by the end of 2006.